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Includes abstract. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-36). ; This paper employs regression analysis in an attempt to identify the factors that impact onthe coverage of highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) and mother-to-childtransmission prevention (MTCTP) in different countries. Both HAART and MTCTP arebased on the administration of antiretroviral drugs and constitute an integral part of asuccessful response to the HIV / AIDS epidemic. Governments play an important role indetermining the level ofHAART and MTCTP coverage in a country.

This paper employs regression analysis in an attempt to identify the factors that impact on the coverage of highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) and mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP) in different countries. Both HAART and MTCTP are based on the administration of antiretroviral drugs and constitute an integral part of a successful response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Governments play an important role in determining the level of HAART and MTCTP coverage in a country. Ordinary least squares estimation reveals that the concentration of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in urban areas and the share of GDP a country spends on health care have a positive impact on HAART coverage and that the incident of health crises other than AIDS negatively impacts on MTCTP coverage. A high HIV prevalence rate and a high influx of international aid are associated with higher levels of HAART and MTCTP coverage. There are significant regional differences in HAART and MTCTP coverage even after the effects of several explanatory variables are controlled for.

Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the travelers dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Furthermore, our results suggest that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and reference-dependent strategic sophistication. We discuss the implications of our results and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.

Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler's dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Our experimental design allows us to show that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and referencedependent strategic sophistication. We discuss policy implications and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.

Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position's factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one's position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, D91, I23)

Does the wish to convince others lead people to persuade themselves about the moral and factual superiority of their position? We investigate this question in the context of two international debating competitions, where persuasion goals (pro or contra a motion) are randomly assigned to debaters shortly before the debate. Using incentives for truthful reporting, we find evidence of self-persuasion in the form of (i) factual beliefs that become more conveniently aligned with the debater's side of the motion, (ii) shifts in attitudes, reflected in an increased willingness to donate to goal-aligned charities, and (iii) higher confidence in the strength of one's position in the debate. Self-persuasion occurs before the debate and subsequent participation in the open exchange of arguments does not lead to convergence in beliefs and attitudes. Our results lend support to interactionist accounts of cognition and suggest that the desire to persuade is an important driver of opinion formation and political partisanship.